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“It is always dangerous to prophesy, particularly about the future.”
—Danish Proverb1
This Article examines the consequences of a previously unrecognized differ-
ence between pollutant cap-and-trade schemes and pollution taxes. Implementa-
tion of cap-and-trade relies on a forecast of future emissions, while
implementation of a pollution tax does not. Realistic policy designs using either
regulatory instrument almost always involve a phase-in over time to avoid eco-
nomic disruption. Cap-and-trade accomplishes this phase-in via a limit on emis-
sions that falls gradually below the forecast of future pollutant emissions.
Emissions taxation accomplishes the same via a gradually increasing levy on
pollution.
Because of the administrative complexity of establishing an emissions trading
market, cap-and-trade programs typically require between three and five years
lead time before imposing obligations on emitters. In this Article, I present new
evidence showing that forecast error over this timeframe for United States en-
ergy-related carbon dioxide emissions from the Department of Energy’s energy
model—the model used for policy design by Congress and EPA—is biased and
imprecise to such a degree as to make its use impractical. The forecasted emissions
are insufficiently accurate to allow for creation of a reliable or predictable market
signal to incentivize emission reductions. By contrast, carbon taxes, because they
do not depend upon a baseline emissions forecast, create a relatively clear level of
policy stringency.
This difference matters because policies that end up weaker than intended
face low odds for strengthening, while those that end up stronger than intended
are likely to be weakened. The political asymmetry combined with actual model
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forecast errors leads to bias in favor of suboptimal, weak, policies for cap-and-
trade. This is a serious concern if, as is usually the case, a cap is set based on
political bargaining rather than on an optimal balancing of abatement costs and
avoided climate damage. By contrast, the same model bias would lead to more
environmentally effective than forecast carbon taxes but without the political con-
sequences created by price volatility, were such programs to be implemented in the
United States. Thus, while theory tells us that cap-and-trade and carbon taxes
can be equivalent, imperfect information leads to suboptimal environmental per-
formance of emissions trading, relative to carbon taxation policies. Policymakers
should weigh these practical, information-related concerns when considering ap-
proaches to controlling emissions of greenhouse gases.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal legislation to reduce climate change does not appear imminent,2
but many states have enacted or are considering enacting controls intended
2. The one bill aimed at pricing greenhouse gas emissions introduced during the 113th
session of Congress received only two sponsors and did not get either a hearing or a vote in
the Environment and Public Works Committee. See Library of Congress, S.332 – Climate
Protection Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-
bill/332?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s.332%22%5D%7D (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
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to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.3 In addition, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) is in the process of crafting guidelines that will com-
pel reductions in power sector emissions in all states.4 How to accomplish
these reductions remains politically and analytically controversial but one
mechanism under serious consideration is emissions trading.5 In fact, green-
house gas emissions trading programs of varying stringency already exist in
ten states as well as one Canadian province.6 Cap-and-trade has received
strong support from economists and policymakers as a mechanism for re-
ducing emissions because of its potential to be cost-effective. Indeed, be-
cause of the apparently higher political opposition to carbon taxes, it is the
3. To date, greenhouse gas emissions are limited within California under Assembly
Bill 32. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. Ch. 488, available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_32_bill_20060927_chap
tered.pdf. Furthermore, carbon dioxide emissions within the power sector in nine Northeast-
ern and Mid-Atlantic states are covered by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). Washington and
Oregon are both considering the feasibility of limiting greenhouse gas emissions using emis-
sions pricing. See CLIMATE LEGISLATIVE & EXEC. WORKGROUP, A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON
THE WORK OF THE CLIMATE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE WORKGROUP 4-5 (2014), available at http://
www.governor.wa.gov/issues/economy/climateWorkgroup/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 13,
2015); Associated Press, Oregon Lawmakers Call for Carbon Tax Study, KATU (last updated
Dec. 16, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.katu.com/politics/Oregon-lawmakers-call-for-carbon-
tax-study-236082221.html.
4. As of this writing, EPA had issued draft regulations covering new coal-fired and
combined cycle gas turbine electric generating units and draft rules that provide guidance to
states on how to limit emissions from existing units in these source categories. See Standards
of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electric Util-
ity Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60, 70, 71, 98); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Press Release, Presidential Memorandum—Power Sector Car-
bon Pollution Standards (June 25, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-standards.
5. Both the Natural Resources Defense Council and a coalition of leading electric
utilities have advocated such an approach. See generally DANIEL A. LASHOF ET AL., NATURAL RES.
DEF. COUNCIL, CLOSING THE POWER PLANT CARBON POLLUTION LOOPHOLE: SMART WAYS THE CLEAN
AIR ACT CAN CLEAN UP AMERICA’S BIGGEST CLIMATE POLLUTERS (2013), available at http://www
.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015); CHRISTOPHER E. VAN ATTEN,
M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCS. LLC, STRUCTURING POWER PLANT EMISSIONS STANDARDS UNDER SECTION
111(d) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT— STANDARDS FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2013), available at http://
www.mjbradley.com/node/237 (last visited Feb. 25, 2015).
6. See Program Design, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/de-
sign (last visited April 3, 2015) (outlining the eight state collaboration to establish a cap-and-
trade program for greenhouse gas emissions from the electric power sector); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 (cap-and-trade for greenhouse gas emissions in California); Envi-
ronmental Quality Act, R.S.Q., c. Q-2 §§ 46.1-46.18 (Can.) (establishing a cap-and-trade
program for greenhouse gas emissions in Quebec).
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preferred alternative of many policy-oriented economists.7 Here, I present
evidence that cap-and-trade programs—that is, regulatory policies that dis-
tribute a fixed number of permits to emit a quantity of a pollutant and then
allow trading of these permits—face substantial and underappreciated im-
plementation hurdles. These challenges arise because policymakers, in de-
signing real cap-and-trade programs, need to predict emissions in future
years. The evidence presented here demonstrates that, in fact, policymakers
are not good at making these predictions and that the magnitude of the
error raises questions about the cap-and-trade regulatory strategy.
There is a substantial body of work in economics that argues for the
relative advantage of emissions pricing over other types of regulation. Ar-
thur Pigou, in 1920, was the first to suggest pricing of private externalities
in order to achieve socially optimal outcomes.8 Pigou argued for the taxa-
tion of private externalities. It was not until much later that proposals for
quantity-based approaches to pricing environmental externalities emerged.9
A quantity-based approach, rather than levying a tax on an externality at a
prescribed tax rate, sets a limit on the quantity of the externality that will
be allowed. A regulator then issues licenses equal to that quantity to private
actors, and then allows for private exchange of these licenses. Price-based
approaches in the environmental realm have come to be called emissions
taxes while quantity-based approaches are known as cap-and-trade. Since
the suggestion of cap-and-trade as an alternative to emissions taxes, a sub-
stantial body of literature has emerged comparing the two regimes10 as well
as suggesting hybrids that incorporate some best aspects of both price and
quantity regulation.11
Parallel to the development of alternative regulatory instruments,
academia, the U.S. government, and the International Energy Agency have
made substantial efforts to develop models aimed at forecasting energy
7. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Wonderful Politics of Cap and Trade, ENVTL. F., Sept.-
Oct. 2009, at 16, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rstavins/Forum/Column_32.pdf.
8. See generally A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
9. See generally W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Con-
trol Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972).
10. The seminal work, comparing how uncertainties in marginal abatement cost might
be traded off against uncertainties in marginal damages, is Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs.
Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).
11. See David Weisbach, Instrument Choice Is Instrument Design, in U.S. ENERGY TAX
POLICY 113 (Gilbert E. Metcalf, ed., 2014); Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew R. Schein,
Carbon Taxes Versus Cap and Trade: A Critical Review, 4 CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. 1350010
(2013); William A. Pizer, Prices vs. Quantities Revisited: The Case of Climate Change 20-21, 26-
27 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-02, 1997).
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trends.12 Over time, as confidence in these models has grown, their use as
long-term forecasting tools in policy design and implementation has ex-
panded. For example, the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS), de-
veloped and maintained by the Energy Information Administration (EIA)
within the Department of Energy, has extended its energy forecasts for the
United States from seventeen years to more than twenty-five.13 As these
forecasts, made annually via a publication called the Annual Energy Out-
look (AEO), have accumulated, so has a vibrant discussion within the en-
ergy modeling community regarding the forecast accuracy of the model.14
Analysts comparing forecasts to reality have noted large errors and potential
biases in NEMS forecasts for a number of key model outputs.15
The argument I make here synthesizes these two literatures and then
connects them to actual policymaking by assessing the use of energy model
forecasts to design and implement real policies to control greenhouse gas
emissions. I show that the extent of energy model forecast error has strong
implications for the instrument choice debate. Economists have long-fa-
vored carbon taxes and cap-and-trade at least in part because they place
lower informational demands upon regulators. In contrast to traditional pre-
scriptive regulation, neither technique requires that regulators know where
or even how pollution reductions will occur in covered sectors. The respon-
sibility for designing the method to reduce pollution rests with the regu-
lated party, not the regulator. I argue here that designing real cap-and-trade
programs may require information that regulators currently do not possess
and are unlikely to ever possess. This, in turn, bears critically on the choice
of instrument by which to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
12. For a history of the Energy Information Administration, see About EIA, U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, http://www.eia.gov/about/legislative_timeline.cfm
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
13. Compare U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
1993 (1993), with U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2013 (2013).
14. See, e.g., Brian C. O’Neill & Mausami Desai, Accuracy of Past Projections of U.S.
Energy Consumption, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 979 (2005) (NEMS overestimates future energy de-
mand with no improvements in forecast error since 1982); J.A. Laitner, S.J. DeCanio, J.G.
Koomey & A.H. Sanstad, Room for Improvement: Increasing the Value of Energy Modeling for
Policy Analysis, 11 UTIL. POL’Y 87, 90-91 (2003) (energy-economic model forecast errors caused
by inadequate representation of behavior of firms and households and of technological
change); Alexander I. Schlyakhter, Daniel M. Kammen, Claire L. Broido & Richard Wilson,
Quantifying the Credibility of Energy Projections from Trends in Past Data, ENERGY POL’Y, Feb.
1994, at 119 (normal error density cannot account for the number of extreme outliers in AEO
forecasts).
15. E.g., Maximilian Auffhammer, The Rationality of EIA Forecasts under Symmetric and
Asymmetric Loss, 29 RES. & ENERGY ECON. 102, 119-20 (2007).
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Before making this argument, it is necessary to unpack what I mean by
“real” cap-and-trade programs. In this argument, real cap-and-trade pro-
grams to control greenhouse gases possess at least two characteristics that
ideal or theoretical policy designs may not. The first is that they are actually
implemented somewhere between three and five years after enactment of
legislation. This time lag is necessary for cap-and-trade because of the com-
plex regulatory apparatus that must be designed and put in place in order to
implement them. Cap-and-trade programs require monitoring of emissions;
they require monitoring of compliance; they require a market design; they
require a system for distributing permits to emit greenhouse gases; and they
require market surveillance. All of that takes time to design in detail, write
regulations concerning, and put into practice. Typical legislative timelines
have envisioned between two and six years of spin-up before regulated firms
would face an actual obligation to comply.16 It is only at this point that the
cap starts to fall below projected future emissions. In other words, the cap is
gradually lowered below the forecast of future emissions. This gradual in-
crease in regulatory stringency is intended to avoid any disruptive economic
impact of the regulation that might result if the stringency of the program
were to increase too rapidly. Therefore, the design of a cap-and-trade pro-
gram requires detailed knowledge of emissions in the future, not just at the
time of legislative enactment.
Second, the stringency of real greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs
is determined by political bargaining in the legislative process, not by refer-
ence to what is necessary to achieve some desired climactic outcome or to
fully internalize the future costs of climate change. Real programs represent
a compromise between the interests of environmental advocates in prevent-
ing climate change and the interests of firms in minimizing regulatory costs
filtered through their relative political power in the legislative process. In
general, this means that real cap-and-trade programs are weaker than neces-
sary to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sys-
tem,”17 at least during the years in which legislators can credibly make
16. The EU Emissions Trading Directive was among the fastest programs from final
legislation to implementation. The Emissions Trading Directive creating the ETS was ap-
proved in 2003 and the program began in 2005. See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse
Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending Council Directive
96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 35. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(Waxman-Markey) envisioned phase-in in 2012, three years later. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009). The California Global Warming Solutions Act was passed in 2006, and envisioned
binding limits on greenhouse gases to be set in 2008 that would apply to 2012 emissions.
Assemb. B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat. Ch. 488.
17. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (1992).
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commitments.18 Policies that are proposed or enacted are weaker than cli-
mate advocates would choose or that economists, seeking to fully internalize
an environmental externality, might suggest. This weakness is important
because it undermines the argument that so long as a cap-and-trade achieves
the objectives it has set (the cap), then environmentalist and/or environ-
mental economist constituencies should rest easy. If the cap is set higher
(less stringent) than is optimal to avoid climate change or internalize the
costs of climate change, then neither group should be satisfied with simply
reducing emissions to the level set by legislation. Of course, half a loaf is
better than none at all.
It is important to emphasize that this description of how limits are set
in practice for cap-and-trade programs is not the only feasible method or
even the first best approach. Theoretically, legislators and regulators could
set a cap on greenhouse gas emissions based on the results they aim to
achieve from the cap. In other words, legislators could design a cap based
upon how much greenhouse gas emissions were environmentally acceptable
rather than based upon how much greenhouse gas emissions cuts are politi-
cally affordable.19 The key difference from the process I describe above is an
indifference to compliance costs. One might analogize this sort of cap set-
ting process to that which EPA employs to determine National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for criteria pollutants.20 In that process, EPA is forbid-
den from considering the costs of abatement and must instead focus only on
setting the standard at a level requisite to protect the public health with an
adequate margin of safety.21 Costs do not enter in. If a similar procedure
were followed for greenhouse gases, a cap would be set based purely upon
the environmental outcomes a legislator or regulator found necessary to
achieve. While a cost-blind approach to setting caps might require a signifi-
cant change in normative attitudes about climate change it cannot be ruled
out as a possibility. Nevertheless, I do not consider it further here.
Alternatively, legislators or regulators could set the cap in a greenhouse
gas cap-and-trade program based upon an optimal balancing of the net pre-
18. Although this timeframe is impossible to determine, for this argument, the first ten
years will suffice. This is very often the timeframe over which U.S. Congressional represent-
atives view legislation because of Senate Pay-Go rules.
19. For a discussion of cap setting in the greenhouse gas cap-and-trade context, see
David M. Driesen, Capping Carbon, 40 ENVTL. L. 1 (2010).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2014).
21. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001). Of course, although
EPA is forbidden from explicitly considering costs when setting a NAAQS, there is strong
anecdotal evidence that the Office of Management and Budget may force it to do so anyway.
See John M. Broder, Obama Administration Abandons Stricter Air-Quality Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/03/science/earth/03air.html.
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sent value of future costs of compliance and benefits from avoided climate
damages.22 This economically optimal cap would still consider the costs of
compliance but would be superior to the process discussed in this paper
because it seeks to maximize social welfare. This process would be distinct
from the process I describe in that it would eliminate the political interest
group bargaining that serves to set acceptable compliance costs. Instead, a
regulator, ideally with perfect information, would determine the socially op-
timal cap for future years. Even with such a well-informed and powerful
regulator, a socially optimal cap setting process that balanced a schedule of
costs and benefits would still depend critically on the type of energy model-
ing I describe below. In particular, it might fall victim to unexpected price
shocks due to technological or macroeconomic events that upset the cap
setting calculus. In what follows, however, I choose to view these two alter-
native modes of setting caps as theoretical possibilities rather than current
real-world policy challenges. Although recognizing these theoretical pos-
sibilities, I assume that caps will instead be set subject to a political bargain-
ing process that focuses on the costs of compliance, as described above.
Energy models such as NEMS have been intimately involved in the
design of congressional proposals to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. De-
signing cap-and-trade policy requires that legislators or regulators set a cap
on emissions several years before the advent of the program. In order to
reach a political compromise on the stringency of the cap, it also requires
that they have some estimate of the regulatory costs that the cap will create
for firms. In the end, whether a cap-and-trade program actually produces
the environmental benefits and compliance costs that underlie the bargain-
ing positions adopted by all parties to the legislative process will, to a sig-
nificant degree, be a function of the accuracy of the emissions forecast that
underpins it. A forecast that underestimates what emissions would have
been absent the program will produce much larger reductions in emissions,
hence environmental benefits but also much higher compliance costs than
expected for firms. Likewise, a cap-and-trade predicated on a forecast that
overestimates future emissions will produce much smaller cuts in emis-
sions—quite possibly none at all—and consequently much lower than ex-
pected compliance costs for firms. Both the environmental benefits and the
compliance costs depend on accurate information about emissions half a
decade hence with sufficient accuracy to create roughly the desired strin-
22. There is a large body of scholarship aimed at determining this idealized cost sched-
ule for pricing carbon based on models that combine economics with simplified climate
models. These models are known as integrated assessment models because they integrate
both economic and climatic impacts of modern society. See generally WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE
CLIMATE CASINO (2013).
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gency of the program. If the forecast is wrong, one party to the political
negotiation will not derive their benefit of the bargain. As will be shown in
the next Part, obtaining this information about the future is more challeng-
ing than it sounds because real cap-and-trade programs require only modest
reductions during their early years.
I. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FORECAST SKILL IN THE NATIONAL
ENERGY MODELING SYSTEM
A. Energy Models
Legislators and regulators need estimates of future greenhouse gas
emissions in order to set the cap in an emissions trading program. They
need this information because cap-and-trade programs phase-in at or near
unregulated emissions levels in their early years and then gradually reduce
permitted emissions, usually in annual steps, to achieve reductions. The
need to forecast follows directly. Accurate forecasting of emissions is theo-
retically possible, assuming that an accurate energy system model can be
developed for a given jurisdiction. Of course, this is no small assumption.
At its core, such a model would need to estimate the gross economic output
of the region, the amount of energy used per unit of output created, and the








Numerous modeling groups work at estimating the components of this
identity for future states of the world. These models typically function by
iteratively solving energy demand or supply within individual modules that
separately simulate different aspects of the energy system. By iteration,
these models converge on a solution where different sectors of the energy-
economic system are in equilibrium with each other. Industries demand
fuels or electricity based upon the prices in the market. Oil and coal mining
companies produce fuels depending on their costs of production and the
prices demanded for their products. The models ultimately produce a stable
prediction of supply-demand balance for oil, natural gas, and coal usage.
From this balance, the models then derive greenhouse gas emissions by mo-
lar conversion of the fuels to their combustion produces, including carbon
dioxide (CO2).
23. This formulation is commonly called the Kaya Identity and has been utilized in
numerous future emissions scenario planning efforts. See P.E. Waggoner & J. H. Ausubel, A
Framework for Sustainability Science: A Renovated IPAT Identity, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7860,
7860-61 (2002).
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The individual sub-modules within these models attempt to capture
rich detail within particular segments of the energy sector. For example, the
electricity module in the NEMS incorporates data generated by EIA re-
porting from all power plants across the United States including the tech-
nology utilized at the power plant, electric power generated, the number of
hours the plant operates, the fuel consumed, and numerous other types of
information.24 In addition, the modules include assumptions about the
availability and costs of alternative technologies formed by extensive and
systematic study. In the case of the NEMS electricity sector module, these
include the feasible range of energy efficiency investments by industry and
building type, renewable energy, co-firing of biomass in fossil generation,
and advanced nuclear power plants amongst others.25 The individual mod-
ules are also constrained by applicable laws and regulations. For example,
power plants in the NEMS electricity cannot simulate behavior that would
violate the Clean Air Act.26
The energy sector modules, when coupled to a macroeconomic model
of the U.S. economy, and to each other, allow for iterative calculation of an
equilibrium forecast of various energy sector parameters in supply-demand
balance. These include but are not limited to production of various fossil
fuels, fuel prices, and fuel consumption by commercial, household, and in-
dustrial sectors. For example, the electricity module receives prices for fuels
along with demand for electricity, and it then estimates which power plants
will operate given the relative fuel costs and demand for energy. This pro-
duces a price for electricity as well as a particular level of demand for oil,
natural gas, and coal. The price is then fed back to the industrial, commer-
cial, and household modules and may drive changes in demand for electric-
ity. The fuel demanded from the electricity sector is fed back to the oil,
natural gas, and coal modules and may drive changes in supply and price of
these inputs. Once consumption of different fuels has been estimated, it is
relatively straightforward to estimate energy-related greenhouse gas emis-
24. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0581, THE NATIONAL ENERGY MODELING SYS-
TEM: AN OVERVIEW 2009 48 (2009).
25. Id. at 43-46.
26. Power plants must comply with the Acid Rain Trading Program and the Clean Air
Interstate Rule. Id. at 48.
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sions.27 Energy models that incorporate the characteristics just described
are maintained in academia,28 the private sector,29 and government.30
B. The Use of the National Energy Modeling System
in the Legislative Process
In this study, I focus on one particular EIA energy model: NEMS.
This model is arguably the most important energy-forecasting tool for the
United States. The primary purpose of NEMS is to provide official U.S.
government forecasts of energy demand and consumption for the United
States. The NEMS is also the primary tool that Congress uses to assess the
costs and benefits, both environmental and economic, of energy and envi-
ronmental legislation. For example, Congressional representatives requested
that EIA utilize NEMS to assess the impacts of five bills aimed at imposing
a cap-and-trade on U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,31 proposing a twenty-
five percent renewable energy standard,32 and lifting the ban on oil drilling
in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge.33 NEMS is the preferred tool in
27. It is important to note that these models do not generally estimate either fugitive
emissions from fossil fuels, for example leakage from natural gas pipeline infrastructure, or
other non-CO2 emissions, for example methane emissions from livestock. Both are poten-
tially significant sources of greenhouse gases although combustion of fossil fuels is thought
to represent approximately eighty-five percent of U.S. emissions. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2012 3-5 (2014).
28. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383ER, ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/fore-
casts/aeo/er/index.cfm.
29. For example, the Rhodium Group maintains a working copy of NEMS that they
modify in order to conduct energy policy studies. See generally TREVOR HOUSER & SHASHANK
MOHAN, FUELING UP : THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICA’S OIL AND GAS BOOM (2014).
30. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2009-05,
ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R. 2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SE-
CURITY ACT OF 2009 (2009) available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/index
.html?featureclicked=2&; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2008-
01, ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF S. 2191, THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE SE-
CURITY ACT OF 2007 (2008), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/s2191/pdf/
sroiaf%282008%2901.pdf; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2007-
06, ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF S. 1766, THE LOW CARBON ECONOMY ACT OF
2007 (2008), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/lcea/pdf/sroiaf%282007%2906
.pdf.
32. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2009-03, IMPACTS OF A
25-PERCENT RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY STANDARD AS PROPOSED IN THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND
SECURITY ACT DISCUSSION DRAFT (2009), available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/
2009/acesa/pdf/sroiaf%282009%2904.pdf.
33. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2008-03, ANALYSIS OF
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE (2008) available at http://www
.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/anwr/pdf/sroiaf%282008%2903.pdf.
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scoring the impacts of major energy legislation in the United States. In a
political debate over climate change and its regulation characterized by par-
tisanship, the model’s attraction is that it is unbiased.
In addition, NEMS also plays an important role in legislative design of
climate policies. It is an important means, indeed perhaps the only means,
for Congress to develop definitive projections of U.S. greenhouse gas emis-
sions into the future. As discussed above, such projections are important to
cap-and-trade design because they are the reference point below which the
cap is designed to fall in order to both reduce emissions and create a cost for
producing pollution that firms will respond to. Because of the need to phase
in reductions in order to avoid economic shocks, in most proposals the ini-
tial reductions are extremely modest relative to either current emissions or
long-term goals. The model is used to specify the critical glide path; it is
relied on to plot emissions in future years relative to emissions levels if left
unchecked by legislation.
To take one example of the use of NEMS for cap-and-trade design,
consider the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(Waxman-Markey).34 The Waxman-Markey legislation would have imposed
a limit of 4627 million metric tons CO2 equivalent35 (MMt CO2e) for
sources covered under the cap in the first year of the program (2012).
Thereafter, the cap falls by approximately two percent per year. The most
current emissions forecast at the time the legislation was proposed found
that sources covered under the cap were projected to emit exactly the same
amount as the cap in its first year—4627 MMt CO2e.36 This is not a coinci-
dence. The cap in the bill was designed using the forecast from the most
recent NEMS reference case.37 Most other cap-and-trade bills proposed
during the last decade have caps very close to the NEMS forecast current
when they were introduced (see Table 1). In only one case, of the five bills
introduced by Congress during the 109th, 110th, and 111th sessions, did the
34. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, June 26, 2009), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.2454:.
35. Id. at sec. 311, § 721. Carbon dioxide equivalent is a unit of mass that converts
emissions of a greenhouse gas to emissions of carbon dioxide using 100-year global warming
potentials. It is the standard measure of account under both domestic and international law.
See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,264 (Oct. 30,
2009).
36. Author’s calculations using data from U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 31; SR/
OIAF/2009-05, ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R. 2454, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, SR/OIAF/2009-03, AN UPDATED ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2009 REFERENCE CASE REFLECTING PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
AND RECENT CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (2009).
37. Email from Phil Barnett, Chief of Staff of Rep. Henry Waxman, to Michael Wara
(Feb. 19, 2014) (on file with author).
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Mar. 26, 2006 AEO 2006 6964 6964 0% 
S. 280 (110th; 
McCain-
Lieberman) 
Jan. 12, 2007 AEO 2006 6130 6161 0.5% 
S. 1766 (110th; 
Bingaman) 
Jul. 11, 2007 AEO 2007 6652 6649 0.1% 
S. 2191 (110th; 
Lieberman-
Warner) 





May 5, 2009 AEO 2009 
Update 
4627 4627 0% 
In that exception, the lack of correlation may be because the bill’s au-
thors opted to allow the use of offsets equal to thirty percent of the cap in
its first year.38 When this additional compliance option is included, the cap
rises to potentially as high as 7508 MMt CO2e, or 12.4 percent above pro-
jected emissions. In this instance, when the combined cap and offsets is
greater than emissions, presumably legislators intended that a combination
of offsets and allowances sufficient to cover emissions would be utilized.
Congress has used NEMS in two ways in its attempts to design and
pass cap-and-trade legislation. First, it has asked EIA to use its energy
model to estimate the costs and benefits of bills introduced by lawmakers.
Second, and more importantly, it appears that legislators have relied on
available emissions forecasts in designing the cap on emissions that lies at
the heart of these bills. In the next Section, I examine the history of NEMS
38. Offsets are certified reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that occur outside of
the sectors covered by the cap-and-trade but which can be credited toward compliance by
covered entities. See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance
and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1770-72 (2008).
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reference cases with the aim of determining whether such reliance is
warranted.
C. A Retrospective Analysis of
NEMS Greenhouse Gas Emissions Forecasts
Most people expect weather forecasts for the next several days to be
more or less accurate. By contrast, most people do not put much stock in a
forecast for a thirty percent chance of rain in fourteen days’ time. There are
good reasons for this. The atmosphere is a complex system. A model initial-
ized with anything less than complete information about the state of the
atmosphere will thus produce less and less reliable forecasts as we look fur-
ther and further into the future. And, despite the best data efforts of
weather forecasters equipped with satellites, information about initial con-
ditions is always incomplete. By about ten days, the weather forecast pro-
duced by the best models initialized with the best data is not much better
than a guess based on the climatological average in a given location. We
have learned to use weather forecasts as useful tools over the one- to seven-
day period as a consequence of weather models decreasing predictive skill.39
Because we understand the rough accuracy and precision of these forecasts,
we are able to plan and act accordingly. We do not cancel a picnic in two
weeks because rain is in the forecast, but we do take our umbrella with us
when we leave the house if the forecast calls for an eighty percent chance of
rain later in the day.
Policymakers rely on emissions forecasts by NEMS or other energy
models in designing cap-and-trade legislation in a similar fashion to a
weather forecast. They depend on such forecasts for designing their plans
and approaches to limiting emissions. Therefore it is worth considering the
predictive ability of these models over the timeframes upon which they are
being relied and relative to the level of accuracy required. In particular, one
wonders why it appears that so many cap-and-trade programs are overallo-
cated—that is have their caps set too high—from the start. While weather
forecasts deteriorate over ten days because of the complexity of atmospheric
circulation, energy models purport to predict the pattern of very complex
systems over time periods ranging from years to decades. This Section as-
sesses that predictive skill. I make this assessment by constructing a dataset
of Annual Energy Outlook forecasts of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide
emissions for the past fifteen years and comparing them, as forecasts,
against the reality that ultimately transpired. That in turn provides an as-
39. See AM . METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y, WEATHER ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING: AN INFORMATION
STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY (2007).
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sessment of whether reliance on emissions forecasts in the design of cap-
and-trade programs is well founded.
1. Methods
The first step in assessing predictive ability or forecast skill is to de-
velop a reference against which forecasts can be compared. In this case, the
obvious reference with which to compare NEMS greenhouse gas emissions
forecasts are the greenhouse gas emissions data released on a regular basis
by EIA.40 These emissions data cover all carbon dioxide emissions associ-
ated with the combustion of fossil fuels in the United States and are created
using the same reporting system used to initialize NEMS. Not included in
EIA estimates are fugitive emissions of carbon dioxide or emissions of other
greenhouse gases such as methane or nitrous oxide.
I collected EIA NEMS-based forecasts of “Total Energy-Related Car-
bon Dioxide Emissions” for reference cases from the Annual Energy Out-
look for each year from 1999 to 2014 (n=16).41 I then computed differences
between forecast emissions and measured emissions, taken from the EIA
Monthly Energy Review Table 12.1.42 These forecast errors were then col-
lated by year relative to the year of release for the AEO that contained
them. For example, the 2005 AEO forecast CO2 emissions of 6627
MMtCO2 in 2010. The EIA Monthly Energy Review reports that actual
emissions in 2010 were 5627 MMTCO2. Thus, the forecast error for the
fifth year post-forecast of the 2005 AEO is 1000 MMtCO2. This methodol-
ogy is applied to every forecast year/pair for the sixteen AEO reference case
forecasts analyzed for this study. Then, all the forecast error time series,
which range from three years prior to the forecast43 to twenty-five years
after the forecast are arranged and compared by year relative to the year of
publication rather than by calendar year. I then compute the mean and stan-
dard deviation of forecast error for the dataset by forecast year. This allows
40. Monthly Energy Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, http://
www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/.
41. Prior to 2004, emissions were expressed by EIA in AEOs in units of tons C. These
emissions were converted to tons CO2, the current units convention, by multiplying by
thirty-two/twelve, the relative atomic masses of CO2 and C. Compare U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2003 91-93
(2003), with U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383, ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2004 103-04 (2004).
42. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0035, MONTHLY EN-
ERGY REVIEW FEBRUARY 2014 159 tbl.12.1 (2014).
43. Annual Energy Outlook forecasts effectively forecast two to three past years of
emissions because these data are not available until after publication of the AEO. Thus, the
2014 AEO includes a “forecast” of 2011, 2012, and 2013 emissions that can vary substantially
from actual emissions, once these are known.
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for an assessment of forecast skill—that is, the skill of NEMS forecasts in
predicting U.S. CO2 emissions at various time horizons.
2. Results
A comparison of actual energy-related CO2 emissions as compared to
annually released NEMS forecasts taken from successive AEO reference
cases from 1999 to 2014 is shown in Figure 1. It can immediately be seen
that forecasts of emissions over the past fifteen years deviate significantly
from observed emissions. This deviation is due to several factors including
the Great Recession, the advent of unconventional oil and gas drilling and
consequent switching from higher-emitting coal to lower-emitting gas in
the electricity sector, and a general decline in the energy consumption per
unit of GDP in the U.S. economy.44
44. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY-RELATED CARBON
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS, 2012 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/car-
bon/archive/2012/index.cfm.
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There are reasons to question whether the period from 1999 to 2012 is
representative of the true variability in emissions forecasts created by the
model. It is certainly the case that two surprises—the subprime mortgage
crisis and subsequent global recession and financial crisis which followed
and the totally unexpected technological innovation in the oil and gas sec-
tor—significantly impact the quality of NEMS forecasts during this inter-
val. Nevertheless, energy surprises have happened frequently since the oil
crises of the 1970s. In particular, the reduction in the energy intensity of
developed economies in response to these oil shocks. Furthermore, the time
period does include more than one full business cycle, including two reces-
sions as well as significant periods of robust economic growth. Nonetheless,
for better or worse, it is the sample for which retrospective forecasts of
emissions are available.
Calculation of forecast error46 for 152 year pairs of NEMS forecast and
reported energy-related carbon dioxide emissions allows for an estimate of
NEMS forecast error as a function of year relative to the year the forecast
was made. These data are presented in Figure 2. Over the time interval
from 1999 to 2015, the forecasts made by NEMS exhibited a strong positive
bias. The model has a strong tendency during the study period to overesti-
mate future emissions. By three years post-forecast, the average error is 383
MMT CO2e or seven percent of 2012 emissions.47 By five years post-fore-
cast, average error is 626 MMT CO2e or twelve percent of 2012 emissions.
By ten years, post-forecast, average error appears to stabilize for the time
period evaluated at approximately 1100 MMT CO2e or twenty percent of
2012 emissions.
46. Forecast error = Forecast – Emissions. Thus, positive values in Figure 2 represent
overestimates of emissions levels in any given year by a NEMS reference case from an
Annual Energy Outlook.
47. 2012 energy-related carbon dioxide emissions were 5282 MMT CO2e. U.S. EN-
ERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 42, at 159 tbl.12.1.
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3. Possible Explanations for NEMS Forecast Error
The biased and highly imprecise forecasts produced by NEMS for U.S.
energy-related CO2 emissions are difficult to explain. In it its own error
analysis, EIA has noticed these and other persistent errors.48 Academics
have also long noted forecasting problems for other variables predicted by
NEMS and other energy models.49 EIA has noticed that this variable,
amongst others appears consistently overestimated and imprecise.50 But
their presentation of the data gives a clue to why EIA may be unconcerned
about this issue.
EIA performs an error analysis that looks at many of the variables it
estimates and compares them in any given year to the true variables. It then
calculates percentage deviations from the true variables. This reflects the
use to which the Annual Energy Outlook is generally put—projecting the
U.S. energy future over the timeframe of the report. Report authors are
unconcerned about particular features of the forecast errors in NEMS be-
cause they do not intend to use NEMS for a particular policy design appli-
cation. EIA’s approach to error analysis also tends to blend larger errors in
out-years with smaller errors in the more predictable near-future, providing
an overly optimistic view of the AEO’s predictive ability. So it is possible
that EIA is either unconcerned about the errors addressed above because it
does not consider the purposes to which the AEO forecast will be put or
that its error analysis has lulled it into thinking that the errors are less
significant than they actually are for the purposes of climate policy design.
In any case, I could find no mention of the problems with greenhouse gas
forecast error in any of the multiple analyses of climate bills that EIA has
performed for members of Congress.51
The persistent bias and imprecision of the NEMS energy-related CO2
forecasts may be explained by at least two and possibly more underlying
factors. First, the model’s creators may have an inherent bias toward over-
prediction. This would make sense if the costs of over-prediction of fossil
fuel use were lower than the costs of under-prediction. In general, over-
predicting fossil fuel use should tend to produce under-predictions of fossil
fuel prices and, in addition, energy planning that is better positioned to deal
with energy crises. That is, when one over-predicts fossil fuel usage, there
will tend to be more happy surprises—contexts in which supplies are more
48. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0640, ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW: EVALUATION OF 2013 AND PRIOR REFERENCE CASE PROJEC-
TIONS 3 tbl.1 (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/retrospective.
49. See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
50. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 48, at 5.
51. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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abundant and cheaper than expected—than unhappy ones. This institutional
reason may at least partially explain the persistent over-prediction of fossil
fuel use and consequent bias in energy-related CO2 emissions in NEMS.
Another reason for over-prediction of fossil fuel use may be that
NEMS, like all energy models, is not as flexible as the world of social,
market, and technological phenomena it seeks to simulate. To a significant
degree, social, cultural, and market structures mediate energy use.52 But
energy models like NEMS cannot simulate changes in the social and cul-
tural factors that underlie and respond to economic and technological
change.53 To the degree that these are significant and responsive to eco-
nomic and technological forcing, models may tend to be both less sensitive
to the general trends of fossil-fuel prices over the last fifty years—toward
higher prices, especially for oil and coal—and to the social and cultural re-
sponses to shorter term price shocks to the energy system. The former
would lead to over-prediction of both fossil fuel use and consequent CO2
emissions. The latter would go some way towards explaining the lack of
precision of NEMS CO2 emissions forecasts.
To some degree, both mechanisms may cause the bias and imprecision
my presentation of NEMS forecasts brings to light. There may also be
other important causes. Whatever the combination of factors that leads to
inaccurate forecasts, policymakers need to bear these informational limita-
tions in mind when they rely on NEMS as a policy design tool.
4. Implications of NEMS Forecast Error
Consider the size of the average error compared to the size of reduc-
tions in cap-and-trade programs considered by Congress. For example,
emission reductions under Waxman-Markey would have been about two
percent per year, beginning in the fourth year after the legislation was pro-
posed. Thus, in year two of the program (four years after the bill was intro-
duced), when the first reductions below business as usual were set to occur,
this forecast error dataset predicts that emissions would have been about ten
percent below the cap. In fact, emissions were approximately twelve percent
below the Waxman-Markey cap in 2012. The consequences of this differ-
ence between assumptions and reality would have been quite stark had the
bill been enacted. Covered sources under the bill would have faced no need
to cut emissions and the price of allowances would have been close to zero
dollars as opposed to the EIA’s ex ante estimate of approximately eighteen
52. For a comprehensive history of the social and cultural mediation of electrification
in America, see generally DAVID E. NYE, ELECTRIFYING AMERICA: SOCIAL MEANINGS OF A NEW
TECHNOLOGY, 1880-1940 (1990).
53. J.A. Laitner, S.J. DeCanio, J.G. Koomey & A.H. Sanstad, supra note 14, at 119-20.
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dollars per ton.54 Under Waxman-Markey, there might have been a positive
price for allowances because of their potential use in future years, but that
would have depended on the credibility of the program in the face of sub-
stantial overallocation of allowances. The Waxman-Markey cap would not
actually have fallen below currently projected emissions until 2015, and
worse, accounting for allowed use of offsets, no reductions from capped
sectors would have been required until 2025.55
Figure 2 should generate caution for any policymaker hoping to gradu-
ally phase in a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program three to six years in
the future. Indeed, the picture is actually a bit worse than it seems for two
reasons: the variance in the forecast errors and the use of allowance banking
in cap-and-trade programs. Variance matters because it impacts the ability
of a policymaker to simply adjust the forecast to correct for bias. The
NEMS forecasts are not only inaccurate; they are also imprecise. Allowance
banking matters because it creates contagion between forecast errors in ad-
jacent years. In other words, a mismatch between forecast and reality in
year one will turn out to impact the stringency of cap-and-trade not just in
that year but also in subsequent years as well.
Taking variance first, note that there is substantial scatter in the fore-
cast error for greenhouse gas emissions shown in Figure 2. In year three, the
standard deviation of forecast error is 255 MMT CO2e growing to 398
MMT CO2e by year five. This variance is equal to between two and four
times the annual reductions of about 100 MMT CO2e envisioned under
Waxman-Markey. This dispersion around the average error has policy rele-
vant consequences for cap-and-trade design. Simply correcting for bias in
the forecast will not resolve the problem of setting a cap on emissions today
to be implemented three to five years hence. Even correcting for bias, the
first compliance obligation, occurring three years after enactment, would
very likely produce either much higher than expected carbon prices with the
result of an unreasonably large impact on the economy or, if the cap is
higher than emissions, a zero dollar carbon price and therefore no impact on
greenhouse gas emissions at all.
Next, the problem of emissions forecast error combined with a gradual
phase-in of cap-and-trade programs is worsened by a design element com-
mon to real cap-and-trade programs: allowance banking and borrowing. The
ability to bank or borrow allowances—that is, to use permits issued in any
given year in a different one—is intended to manage unexpected shocks that
lead to large changes in demand for permits. When a cap-and-trade pro-
gram allows regulated sources to hold allowances issued in one year for
54. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 31, at 13.
55. Author’s calculations.
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compliance in a later year, or to borrow allowances from future years for
compliance in the current year, the effect is to integrate caps across multiple
years. This integration is ultimately limited by the cost of holding (or bor-
rowing) allowances—in theory, representative of a firm’s cost of capital. In
reality, the incentives to bank allowances are more complex because the
policies governing the cap-and-trade may change. Banking and borrowing
provisions are attractive to policymakers because they are thought to reduce
volatility in emissions trading markets.56 The consequence of this for a
phased-in program is that if emissions estimates used to craft the program
were too high or too low in multiple consecutive years, these errors will
accumulate leading to either very high prices because of unanticipated strin-
gency over a period of multiple years or, as has more often been the case,
very low prices leading to accumulation of a large bank of unused
allowances.57
In this Part, I have shown the role that energy models play in designing
real cap-and-trade programs and the vulnerability this creates. The evidence
shows that existing models are not up to the task that cap-and-trade legisla-
tion sets for them. Designers of legislation aimed at capping emissions de-
pend on energy models not just to project environmental benefits and
abatement costs but also in order to design the phase-in of these programs.
Unfortunately, the energy model for projections of future emissions that is
actually used to design and evaluate U.S. energy and climate legislation
lacks the necessary accuracy and precision to play this role given its forecast
error and the timing and rate at which emission reductions occur under
most proposals. One response to this problem has been to suggest that cap-
and-trade programs should be designed with the expectation that the cap
will be adjusted in the future.58 In theory, such a process might work to
strike the balance between expected stringency, environmental benefits, and
abatement costs. However, there are compelling reasons to think that in
practice, the political economy of strengthening the stringency of a cap to
achieve expected environmental benefits and incur expected pollution
abatement costs differs considerably from the political economy of weaken-
ing a cap. The next Part discusses the likely responses to a cap that is set too
low or too high because of an inaccurate baseline emissions forecast and
compares this to the other approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions
favored in the environmental economics literature—carbon taxes.
56. See Goulder & Schein, supra note 11, at 13.
57. See generally Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-Trade:
Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009) (observing consistent overallo-
cation in a survey of four existing cap-and-trade programs).
58. Id. at 435-36; see also Weitzman, supra note 10, at 482.
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II. THE DESIGN AND MODIFICATION OF
EMISSIONS PRICING POLICIES
In this Part, I explain how recent emissions pricing schemes—both cap-
and-trade and carbon tax proposals—have been designed in order to avoid
creating economic disruption as compliance is phased in. The Article then
explores theoretical arguments for and empirical evidence of an asymmetric
political economy in the modification of existing cap-and-trade and carbon
tax programs. For cap-and-trade, most available evidence supports the hy-
pothesis that it is easier to develop constituencies supporting reductions in
stringency in the presence of unexpectedly high allowance prices than the
reverse. For carbon taxes, the situation appears different. Here, available
evidence suggests that, particularly where carbon taxes involve explicit cuts
to other taxes, the status quo is likely to be more stable and, to the degree
that policy change is considered, political support for strengthening and
weakening the tax is likely to be more balanced. Given that either policy is
likely to be weaker than necessary to optimize societal welfare, as described
in the Introduction, and the likelihood of large forecasting errors in setting
the cap, demonstrated in Part I, these political economy considerations lend
support to the choice of a carbon tax over a cap-and-trade program.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that mid-stream policy ad-
justment is only necessary or desirable if the initial policy design is subop-
timal because of political constraints and/or the actual stringency of the
policy turns out to be very different than prior expectations. That is,
strengthening of a policy is only important if short-term political con-
straints result in less than societally-optimal commitments to reduce emis-
sions. Likewise, weakening of a policy is only important if the program
turns out to generate much higher costs than anticipated. Given the infor-
mation presented above, even if a socially optimal approach that appropri-
ately balanced the costs and benefits of climate policy over the relevant time
scales were adopted, there still might be a need for midstream policy adjust-
ment because of the variance in emission forecasts used to set the cap. If the
right emissions limits are set in a cap-and-trade program and the emissions
forecast is correct, no adjustment would be needed because they will accom-
plish the environmental objectives of the policy at the expected price. Be-
cause the former, suboptimal outcome is far more likely than the latter,
idealized outcome, in a world where regulation of greenhouse gases pro-
duces costs today and discounted intergenerational benefits in the distant
future, the balance of this discussion will assume that policies under consid-
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eration are likely to be too lax rather than too stringent.59 This assumption
is also consistent with the bias in NEMS emissions forecasts described
above. These forecasts, because they overestimated emissions, would have
tended to make cap-and-trade programs far less stringent than intended.
A. Phase-In of Greenhouse Gas Pricing Policies
Many argue that allowance prices should not matter, so long as the cap
is set appropriately.60 In theory, a cap should be determined via optimiza-
tion of the schedule of social costs and benefits of avoiding climate damages,
discounted to present value.61 In practice, at least so far, limits on green-
house gas emissions appear to be set, especially in the near to medium term,
by a balancing of political interests.62 Environmentalists favor deep cuts to
emissions while high compliance costs are opposed by industry. To some
degree, deeper reductions may tradeoff against other provisions that will
benefit regulated firms such as transfers of free permits or other types of
compliance flexibility such as offsets.63 This political bargaining boils down
to a negotiation about the costs to regulated firms of cuts below a baseline
scenario of future emissions. The outcome is ultimately decided by a politi-
59. For arguments why climate change is a “super wicked” problem because costs are
near term while benefits accrue in the distant future, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super
Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 1153 (2009).
60. See Robert Stavins, Low Prices a Problem? Making Sense of Misleading Talk about Cap-
and-Trade in Europe and the USA, ECON. VIEW ENV’T (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.robert-
stavinsblog.org/2012/04/25/low-prices-a-problem-making-sense-of-misleading-talk-about-
cap-and-trade-in-europe-and-the-usa/.
61. Caps for greenhouse gas emissions are not typically set based upon a health based
standard as is the case for local air pollutants such as those regulated under the Acid Rain
Trading Program, the NOx SIP Call, or the Cross State Air Pollution Rule. The reason is
that the damages caused by greenhouse gases are separated by decades to centuries from the
time of their emission. By contrast, most traditional air pollutants that have been subjected
to cap-and-trade regulation cause harm on a timescale of hours to weeks.
62. The best example of this process is the pre-legislative bargaining that occurred in
the lead up to the Waxman-Markey legislation. During that process, a formalized process
that included stakeholders on all sides was used to develop a rough blueprint that was then
adopted by legislators in the legislation. Parties to the negotiation agreed in exchange for a
seat at the table to refrain from lobbying outside the four corners of their agreement. See
generally UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION: CON-
SENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. CLIMATE PROTECTION LEGISLATION (2009), available at http://
www.us-cap.org/policy-statements/.
63. For example, the American Clean Energy and Security Act contained numerous
grants of allowances to impacted industries as well as provision for use of domestic and
international greenhouse gas offsets sufficient to cover close to a third of U.S. emissions.
Moreover, the broad outlines of this framework were agreed to by a coalition of environmen-
tal and industry groups prior to legislation being introduced. See id. at 25.
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cal process unlikely to be controlled by optimization of societal costs and
benefits, even assuming that all parties could agree to the appropriate
method for discounting the future benefits of greenhouse gas regulation.
Even if this regulatory bargaining did not occur, that is, even if legisla-
tors set caps based on social welfare maximization or even without consider-
ation of costs, cuts in emissions would likely be phased in gradually from a
forecast baseline path in order to avoid unnecessary economic disruption to
regulated sectors and energy-intensive industries.64 To take one real exam-
ple of this phased-in approach, the cap under Waxman-Markey was de-
signed to fall by between 83 and 107 million metric tons carbon dioxide
equivalent per year (MMT CO2e/y) below an emissions forecast during its
first nine years of implementation, after which the rate of decrease was to
increase to 155 MMT CO2e/y.65 Gradual phase-in of this type is a near
universal feature of greenhouse gas cap-and-trade bills introduced during
the past decade.66
Another way of expressing the magnitude of these early reductions is
that typical cap-and-trade programs proposed in Congress during the pe-
riod from 2006 to 2010 created a glide path that ultimately required cumu-
lative reductions of approximately 5000 MMT CO2e during their first
decade of implementation. This cumulative reduction is particularly appro-
priate for emissions trading systems that incorporate banking and borrow-
ing provisions. All the bills introduced during this period incorporated
banking and borrowing in some fashion.67
While there are far fewer examples of federal legislative efforts aimed
at implementing a carbon tax, and these efforts have received nothing like
the attention bestowed upon cap-and-trade bills, a clear pattern of how this
type of legislation handles the phase-in process is also apparent. These pro-
grams typically propose an initial tax to be levied on greenhouse gas emis-
64. Gradual phase-in over time combined with trading allows industrial sectors with
compliance costs to avoid premature retirement of long-lived capital assets.
65. Data based on U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 31 (EIA analysis of H.R.
2454, American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009) (on file with author).
66. Some bills have a declining yearly cap. Others set a cap that is the same in every
year for up to a decade before ratcheting down. In either case, so long as banking and
borrowing are allowed, there is no difference in stringency since firms can opt to over- or
under-comply based on their abatement opportunities and cost of capital. Because all legisla-
tion and policies to date allowed for banking of emissions allowances, it is the integral of
allowances issued over some time period that acts to bind emissions. The time period is set
either by rules governing when allowances of a particular vintage can be surrendered or by
the extent to which participants believe the program will endure.
67. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th
Cong., sec. 311, § 725 (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c111:H.R.2454.
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sions that increases in some regular way on an annual basis. For example,
legislation introduced during the last session of Congress proposed levying
a carbon tax of twenty dollars per ton CO2e on all fossil fuels in 2014. In
subsequent years, the tax would have increased under the legislation by 5.6%
per year above the consumer price index.68 Modeling work assessing the
likely impacts of this bill on U.S. emissions suggests that it would reduce
U.S. fossil fuel related emissions by seventeen percent below 2005 levels by
2020, equivalent to about one percent reduction per year and just achieving
the commitment made by the United States under the Copenhagen Ac-
cord.69 Thus, as with cap-and-trade, proposals to tax carbon incorporate a
gradual phase-in process in order to avoid introducing an economic shock to
the energy sector and so to the economy. In the real world, costs are consid-
ered and the forecast economic impacts of climate legislation play an impor-
tant role in determining its stringency.
The consequences for cap-and-trade and carbon tax phase-in of the
model forecast errors discussed in Part I are different in important ways.
Two types of forecast error were shown to be significant in Part I: variance
and bias. These are worth considering separately and for each policy be-
cause the consequences are distinct. Variance of forecast greenhouse gas
emissions means that there is uncertainty relative to a forecast emissions
level for a given year about how close or far actual emissions will be. Impor-
tantly, variance is symmetric about the mean forecast. That is, there is an
equal chance of being above or below the forecast in any given year. Because
greenhouse gases are stock pollutants—what matters is their total concentra-
tion in the atmosphere, not their current emissions rates, there are not
strong environmental protection reasons to be concerned with variance in
emission rates, but there may be important market start-up or political
reasons.
Emissions forecast variance will, for a cap-and-trade program, tend to
create variance in allowance prices. To some degree, such uncertainty can be
reduced for cap-and-trade by utilizing strategies that allow firms to access
additional allowances or carbon offsets when prices or high and by storing
or banking unneeded allowances when prices are low. During phase-in of
cap-and-trade, the greatest risk or emissions variance may be that initial
price formation in the market will be volatile. Because early demand for
allowances is modest due to small initial cuts in emissions, any unexpected
68. Climate Protection Act of 2013, S. 332, 113th Cong., sec. 101, § 196 (2013).
69. Michael W. Wara, Danny Cullenward, Jordan T. Wilkerson & John Weyant, Analy-
sis of the Climate Protection Act of 2013 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 459, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2392656.
288 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 4:2
downward demand shock, for example an economic recession, can quickly
drive allowance prices to low values, lowering incentives for abatement. For
a carbon tax, downward demand shocks will combine with a stable carbon
price to produce greater than expected abatement. On the other hand, be-
cause firms have certainty with respect to compliance costs, upward demand
shocks, for example a large economic expansion, will lead to higher than
expected early demand for allowances in cap-and-trade, hence higher com-
pliance costs and higher than expected emissions under a carbon tax. The
significance of any of these unexpected outcomes remains modest however
so long as such variation in stringency of the policy is cyclical. If so, over
time, total emissions to the atmosphere will approximate the forecasts made
prior to enactment and so achieve the goals of climate policymakers.
The same cannot be said for the consequences of bias in emissions fore-
casts for cap-and-trade and carbon taxes. If, as in Part I, the forecast used to
construct a cap-and-trade or carbon tax has a bias towards under-predicting
emissions in the future, there can be significant and different consequences
for phase-in of the two policies. For a cap-and-trade, low-biased emissions
forecasts mean that a cap-and-trade market will produce lower allowance
prices than expected throughout its lifetime. Firms will have weaker than
expected incentives to reduce emissions. Actual abatement will be less than
expected. And there will be no expectation that this situation will change
over time. This means that, while the agreed to level of reductions will still
be achieved, the cap will not reflect the level that could have been achieved
by interests favoring environmental protection given their bargaining power
had they had unbiased information during the policy formation process.
By contrast, a carbon-tax enacted based upon a low-biased emissions
forecast, such as the one discussed in Part I, will tend to outperform expec-
tations during its phase-in period. That is, because firms face the same in-
centive—the tax rate—to reduce emissions but find that it is easier to do so
than predicted by the model, emissions will fall more than predicted by the
model as the tax rate increases. In that case, environmental interests will
achieve a greater level of reductions than they had expected. Note however,
that this achievement is the logical consequence of the balance of environ-
mental and industry bargaining power during the policy formation process.
Recall that, as outlined in the Introduction, firms and environmental inter-
ests bargain to a socially suboptimal level of greenhouse gas emissions based
upon beliefs about compliance costs. If so, then environmental interests
have not gotten anything more than the benefit of their legislative bargain
when, in response to an agreed upon carbon tax, firms reduce emissions
more than they expected to because compliance costs turn out lower than
expected.
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Of course, these unexpected results are not the end of the story. The
next Section examines theoretical arguments for and empirical evidence of
how these programs are modified in response to differences between their
expected and actual stringency. As was shown in Part I, the actual strin-
gency of cap-and-trade program is likely to be highly uncertain due to its
dependence on a forecast of future greenhouse gas emissions. So we should,
and do, find that most of the action to modify policies occurs in cap-and-
trade programs.
B. Modification of Greenhouse Gas Pricing Policies
1. Cap-and-Trade
The timeline needed to develop a cap-and-trade program and the mod-
est near-term objectives implied by a phase-in require that emissions fore-
casts be sufficiently accurate to avoid either overallocation of emission
allowances that results from too high an emission forecast or underalloca-
tion of emission allowances that results from too low an emission forecast.
Overallocation occurs when there are more emissions allowances than emis-
sions and so permit prices drop to zero or near zero. Underallocation occurs
when the demand for allowances is far greater than expected, leading to
high prices in the emissions trading market and to higher overall economic
costs for the program. Both outcomes are a major source of concern because
of the political bargaining that is at the heart of setting near term caps, the
concern that climate policy should actually produce reductions in emissions,
and the fear that a climate policy might unintentionally create economic
disruption.
As was shown in Part I, EIA model forecast error assures that these
types of errors are very likely to occur, with a bias toward lack of stringency
and hence environmental benefit caused by overestimation of future emis-
sions. Caps that end up being less stringent than expected will lead to calls
for renegotiation because they fail to provide expected environmental bene-
fits—emissions reductions. Caps that end up requiring greater than ex-
pected reductions will result in similar calls because they create
unacceptable economic costs. But the two negotiating situations have starkly
differing political economy that shrink the odds of increases to and raise the
odds of reductions in the stringency of a cap-and-trade program.
In the case of a cap that is less stringent than expected because baseline
emissions turn out lower than forecast, theory and evidence suggest that
increasing stringency will be difficult. Forces pushing for increased strin-
gency must overcome opposition from regulated industry to tighten the cap
and increase stringency. This is in many ways a challenge equivalent to
enacting carbon legislation in the first place. While environmental advo-
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cates must have overcome industry opposition to establish a cap-and-trade,
there is no guarantee that they will be able to do so again if circumstances
suggest it should be modified to increase its stringency.
One real-world example of the challenges associated with tightening a
program exists currently in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), an
EU-wide cap-and-trade covering emissions of greenhouse gases from major
stationary sources. The EU ETS was established in 2005. During its first
two phases of trading, the program repeatedly struggled with overallocation
issues.70 However, since these first two trading phases were designed as a
trial period and then for the purpose of complying with the Kyoto Protocol,
low prices were not necessarily a concern. In the current phase of trading—
where actual reductions in emissions are the only goal—there is no interna-
tional agreement with which to comply and the cap was negotiated inter-
nally by EU member governments and the European Commission, prices
again started high and have ended up quite low due to overallocation.
Environmental advocates have struggled for four years to reduce what
they perceive to be an oversupply of allowances in the third phase of the
program. In 2013, the European Commission managed to temporarily re-
duce the supply of permits via adoption of a proposal to “backload” their
release.71 The backloading plan delays the release of 900 million allowances
to the market from 2014-2016 until 2019-2020.72 This is a significant
achievement for environmental advocates. But does it count as evidence
against my hypothesis that cap-and-trade markets that are less stringent
than expected will not be strengthened? I would argue that context mat-
ters—expectations prior to the advent of Phase Three of the EU ETS were
that carbon prices would be in the range of twenty-seven to thirty-nine
euros per ton CO2.73 They were initially near the low end of this price
before the market realized the lack of stringency in the cap. At the time that
the backloading plan was approved, prices had fallen to three euros. The
short-term stringency of the EU ETS was definitely increased by deferring
issuance of nearly one billion allowances, best evidenced by a price jump to
70. For a comprehensive recent review of the allocation issue in the EU ETS, see
generally Tim Laing, Misato Sato, Michael Grubb & Claudia Comberti, Assessing the Effec-
tiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System (Ctr. for Climate Change Econ. & Policy, Work-
ing Paper No. 126, 2013), available at http://www.cccep.ac.uk/Publications/Working-papers/
Papers/120-129/WP126-effectiveness-eu-emissions-trading-system.pdf.
71. Commission Regulation 176/2014 of 25 February 2014, Amending Regulation (EU)
No 1031/2010 in Particular to Determine the Volumes of Greenhouse Gas Emission Al-
lowances to be Auctioned in 2013-20, 2014 O.J. (L 56) 11 (EU).
72. Id. at Annex IV.
73. See CARBON TRUST, CUTTING CARBON IN EUROPE: THE 2020 PLANS AND THE FUTURE OF
THE EU ETS 31 (2008), available at http://www.carbontrust.com/resources/reports/advice/
eu-ets-the-european-emissions-trading-scheme.
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six euros in the price of allowances. But the back loading proposal is not an
actual reduction in supply of allowances, only a delay, and the cap is still
not anywhere near as stringent as was expected in 2008, when it was de-
signed.74 Those that favored lowering the cap, rather than shifting it when
compliance instruments become available, pushed hard for a reduction in
overall allowance supply. At least so far, governments opposed to raising the
carbon price have been able to block renegotiation of the overall cap on
greenhouse gases.75 Partly as a result, coal-fired power production has actu-
ally increased and gas-fired power generation has decreased in the EU dur-
ing the operation of the ETS.76 Thus, even in the EU, which is a relatively
supportive political environment, the strengthening of a cap-and-trade pro-
gram in the face of unexpectedly low stringency is a challenging political
enterprise.
In theory, once allowances have been distributed, holders of these per-
mits—particularly speculative holders—will have an interest in seeing the
value of their assets increase. One logical way to increase the value of an
allowance is to increase the level of stringency within a cap-and-trade pro-
gram. In most cap-and-trade programs to date, the preponderance of allow-
ance-holders purchase allowances for compliance purposes. Thus they do
not have a strong interest in seeing the cost of allowances increase because
this necessarily implies higher compliance costs. For example, there was no
lobbying on the part of the power sector for increased stringency in the EU
ETS during any of the phases for which overallocation has occurred.
Another example of overallocation in a cap-and-trade regime occurred
closer to home. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cap-
and-trade program limiting greenhouse gas emissions from electric power
plants in nine northeastern states.77 RGGI began in 2009 and was designed
to be a trial phase that would accustom the power sector in the northeast to
operating under a cap—at that time to be (and currently) administered by
74. In response to the passage of the backloading proposal, prices did increase in the
EU ETS, but only from about 3 to about 6 euros. See Ben Garside, EU Plan to Cut Supply of
Carbon Permits Passes Into Law, REUTERS, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
02/26/us-eu-carbon-backloading-idUSBREA1P09C20140226.
75. See Silvio Marcacci, EU Parliament Approves Backloading Fix to Cap and Trade Mar-
ket, CLEANTECHNICA, July 3, 2013, http://cleantechnica.com/2013/07/03/eu-parliament-ap-
proves-backloading-fix-to-cap-and-trade-market/.
76. Another important cause of this increase in coal-fired electricity production is
lower coal import prices from the United States. Daneil Gros & Jonas Teucsh, Does Coal
Have a Long Term Future in Europe?, CORNERSTONE, Oct. 11, 2013, http://cornerstonemag.net/
does-coal-have-a-long-term-future-in-europe/.
77. Current participants include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont. New Jersey was an early
member but dropped out of the program. See Program Design, supra note 6.
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state agencies, in the future perhaps by EPA. The first phase of RGGI
lasted from 2009 to 2014 and was designed with low prices in mind. Indeed,
ex-ante modeling by ICF using its Integrated Planning Model indicated
that allowance prices would be on the order of two dollars during the trial
phase. In fact, given the economic recession and the plunge in natural gas
prices during the first period of RGGI, allowance prices would have
plunged to zero but for the fact that almost all allowances in the RGGI
system were auctioned and there was a reserve price of less than two dollars
per ton CO2. This reserve price meant that when supply of allowances out-
stripped demand in RGGI, the states reduced supply to avoid a complete
price collapse. In effect, RGGI has served as a modest carbon tax—set at the
auction reserve price—whose revenues have mostly been directed towards
energy efficiency investments during the early years of the program.
In 2012, the RGGI states decided to lower the cap significantly in order
to remove excess supply and move the allowance price above the mini-
mum.78 Further, the cap is set to fall by 2.5 percent per year during the
period from 2014 to 2020.79 Current allowance prices are approximately five
dollars per ton CO2.80 This increase in stringency is dramatic and repre-
sents contrary evidence to my hypothesis that weak cap-and-trade programs
will rarely be strengthened. The states that administer RGGI have indeed
strengthened their program—although to a fairly limited degree. What ex-
plains this change that appears to contradict my hypothesis that weak cap-
and-trade programs tend not to be strengthened?
The explanation may be that RGGI states and their regulators are posi-
tioning themselves to comply with forthcoming EPA regulations limiting
greenhouse gas emissions from electric power plants.81 An overallocated
cap-and-trade cannot serve as a model for reducing emissions. At the same
time, RGGI states regulators would be reasonable in not wanting to have
the work they have done negated by preempting EPA regulations. RGGI’s
future will likely be determined not by decisions that its member states
make but by the need to comply with these regulations. These regulations
allow for multi-state compliance along the lines of RGGI’s program design
78. See The RGGI CO2 Cap, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/
design/overview/cap (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
79. Id.
80. As of this writing, the clearing price in the most recent RGGI auction was $5.02.
Auction 24, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/
results/auctions-1-25?id=250 (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
81. See, e.g., DEEP Proposes Revised Regulations to Strengthen RGGI: New Cap on Power
Plants Will Reduce Carbon Emissions, CONN. DEP ’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT. (July 16, 2013),
http://www.ct.gov/Deep/cwp/view.asp?A=4380&Q=528382 (citing consistency with Presi-
dent Obama’s climate plan to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants).
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and have a level of stringency not too different from RGGI’s.82 So here, an
example may exist of a cap-and-trade being strengthened—but perhaps only
in order to prepare for compliance with or influence the shape of an exter-
nally imposed mandate limiting emissions.
These examples suggest a few conclusions. First, it appears that overal-
location and a general lack of stringency are serious concerns in many cap-
and-trade programs. At the same time, strengthening these programs to
produce expected levels of stringency has proven challenging, perhaps ex-
cept when there are external forces that might encourage legislators and
regulators to do so. The evidence from the EU suggests the politics of
strengthening a cap is very tough, even where there is general support for
climate policy. The evidence from RGGI suggests that under certain cir-
cumstances, the politics of regulation do support strengthening caps, but
that these circumstances may involve external forces. In the case of RGGI,
that external force is likely the expected regulation of power plant CO2
emissions by the EPA.
By contrast, in the case of a cap that becomes unexpectedly stringent,
both theory and evidence suggest that cap-and-trade programs will face a
strong political challenge. This is because unexpectedly high allowance
prices are likely to be economically disruptive to a large segment of an
economy, either directly via the obligation to surrender allowances or indi-
rectly via their impact on energy prices. These impacts would likely induce
a broad constituency to lobby for relaxation of the cap-and-trade’s
stringency.
We have just one real-world example of unexpected stringency caused
by an external shock within a cap-and-trade program. This occurred during
the California electricity crisis, when power plants were relieved of their
obligation to comply with the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RE-
CLAIM) program, a cap-and-trade for smog-forming pollutants adminis-
tered by the South Coast Air Quality Management District. The
82. The RGGI cap for 2014 to 2020 envisions a fifteen percent cut below the 2014 cap.
EPA’s Clean Power Plan is projected to produce a twelve percent reduction in CO2 reduc-
tions from the U.S. electric power sector, but this reduction is not distributed uniformly
across states. See The RGGI CO2 Cap, supra note 78; Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830,
34,843 tbl.4, 34,931 tbl.10 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-06-18/pdf/2014-13726.pdf (showing es-
timated cuts of twelve percent below 2012 emissions in the year 2020); Sonal Patel, The
EPA’s Clean Power Rule in Three Infographics, POWER, July 1, 2014, http://www.powermag.com/
the-epas-clean-power-rule-in-three-infographics/ (showing reductions already achieved by
2012); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Util-
ity Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,952 (EPA Clean Power Plan allows for multistate
compliance plans).
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RECLAIM program was initially overallocated, with allowances far exceed-
ing emissions by regulated sources. But in 2000, when electricity prices
spiked, so did demand for power generation in Southern California. As a
result, allowance prices increased by a factor of ten and there was significant
scarcity within the market. In response to this crisis, power plants were
taken out of the RECLAIM cap-and-trade and allowance prices returned to
the “normal” levels. This external shock, caused by poor regulatory design in
the newly restructured California electricity market as well as other fac-
tors,83 caused allowance prices to spike. As soon as these environmental
compliance obligations became higher than expected, the power sector was
relieved of their obligation to comply.84 Interestingly, although the cap-
and-trade was suspended for power plants, long-term electricity contracts
signed during the crisis were enforced.85 Thus, when the energy sector was
under strain, the environmental property rights received far less protection
than ordinary electricity related contracts. This cautionary tale matches the
political economy argument presented above—in a case where compliance
costs under cap-and-trade turned out to be higher than expected, firms were
relieved of these obligations.
A slightly more hypothetical example exists in California’s current cap-
and-trade program. Assembly Bill 32 is the statutory basis for California’s
suite of climate policies, including its cap-and-trade.86 From the start, As-
sembly Bill 32 has included explicit provision for delay of all or part of the
climate change program by order of the Governor in the event that he finds
that the program will cause “significant economic harm” to the state.87 Even
as permit prices are near the reserve price in California’s carbon allowance
auctions,88 there is significant concern in California about the need to intro-
83. For a history of the California electricity crisis, see generally JAMES L. SWEENEY,
THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS (2002). For a history of the RECLAIM program, including
initial overallocation and the response to the California electricity crisis, see U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT’S RE-
GIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET – LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS AND INNOVATION 12-
16 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/Region09/air/reclaim/index.html.
84. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 83, at 15.
85. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. of Snohmish Cnty., 554
U.S. 527 (2008).
86. Assemb. B. 32, California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 2006 Cal. Stat.
Ch. 488.
87. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38599(a).
88. As of this writing, auction clearing prices are very near auction reserve prices. In
the most recent CCA Allowance Auction, administered by the California Air Resources
Board on August 8, 2014, the clearing price was $11.50 per allowance while the reserve price
was $11.34. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD
QUARTERLY AUCTION 8, AUGUST 2014: SUMMARY RESULTS REPORT, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ca-
pandtrade/auction/august-2014/results.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
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duce additional means of avoiding price spikes for fear of the Governor
exercising this option.89 There is no equivalent provision aimed at increas-
ing the stringency of the program. Therefore, in at least two examples,
evidence exists that cap-and-trade programs are vulnerable to weakening in
the face of higher than expected allowance prices.
In conclusion, regulated sources of emissions, and those that might in-
vest in new technologies to lower emissions from such sources, face a con-
text in which emissions, hence program stringency, is inexorably uncertain.
At the same time, these firms likely realize that if stringency turns out
stronger than expected, there is a high likelihood of program modification.
They also likely realize that if program stringency turns out weaker than
expected, there is a much lower likelihood of program modification and so
they are likely to benefit from lower compliance costs. Thus, one might
conceive of cap-and-trade programs as giving regulated sources the upside
risk that compliance costs will be lower than expected but providing them
with a put option on the downside risk in the form of the political ability to
suspend the program, should compliance costs turn out higher than ex-
pected. Thus, risk adjusted costs of cap-and-trade for regulated firms—that
is, the actual incentive that firms will respond to when making investment
decisions—are likely lower than the expected value for allowance prices sug-
gests. How much lower will depend most strongly on the maximum compli-
ance cost that is politically acceptable within a jurisdiction.
2. Carbon Tax
A carbon tax sets a price rather than a quantity limit on emissions.
Under a carbon tax, firms know how much each ton will cost to emit, but a
model is required to determine how much the economy as a whole will
produce in response to this incentive. This difference from cap-and-trade
creates a different expectations problem. A tax faces the possibility that
reductions in emissions may turn out to be different than projected. On the
other hand, the costs of compliance per unit of output are much more cer-
tain for a carbon tax than for a cap-and-trade. Furthermore, many of the
changes that would impact compliance costs are under the control of the
firm tasked with compliance—for example, investment in new energy effi-
cient or low-carbon capital stock. Both aspects of the impact of a carbon tax
are politically significant because both facilitate planning and minimize the
89. Severin Bornstein, James Bushnell, Frank A. Wolak & Matthew Zaragoza-Watkins,
Report of the Market Simulation Group on Competitive Supply/Demand Balance in the California
Allowance Market and the Potential for Market Manipulation 5-6 (Energy Inst. at Haas, Work-
ing Paper No. 251, 2014), available at http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/working_papers/WP251
.pdf.
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chance of unexpectedly low (or high) compliance costs. Conversely, what a
carbon tax gains in terms of certainty of costs it gives up in terms of cer-
tainty on environmental outcome, which may have its own set of political
consequences.
The implication of this price certainty but quantity uncertainty is that
forecast errors for carbon taxes will take the form of uncertain outcomes in
terms of emissions rather than compliance costs. Thus it might be the case
that a carbon tax set at some rate, or, more likely, a schedule of rates,90 will
produce more or less emissions as an outcome than forecast at the time of
adoption. If a carbon tax produces higher emission levels, hence fewer emis-
sion reductions than forecast, it is likely to face many of the same challenges
that a cap-and-trade program faces. There will be a wide array of business
interests that are opposed to strengthening the scheme with only a few
proponents—principally environmentalists and suppliers of low-carbon en-
ergy resources—in support. Under such circumstances, a carbon tax may
face long odds. Just as for cap-and-trade programs, once enacted, it seems
likely that carbon taxes would be difficult to strengthen.
On the other hand, the structure of the carbon tax policy, one that
produces relatively certain compliance costs for firms, tends to minimize
the chances of an unexpectedly stringent program (one that produces much
lower emissions and hence greater emissions reductions) being repealed. In
that case, emissions will be lower—perhaps closer to a first best trajectory
than political bargaining at the time of adoption allowed for—but without
the possibility as in the RECLAIM program that firms will be relieved of
their compliance costs for the simple reason that the compliance costs are
just what was agreed to in the political bargaining process. It is the results
of those costs, emissions reductions, that have turned out greater than
expected.
In addition, carbon taxes may create different political coalitions than
tend to exist for cap-and-trade. Many carbon taxes, either proposed91 or
actual,92 involve offsetting cuts in other distortionary taxes.93 Theoretically,
90. Most proposed or enacted carbon taxes envision a schedule of rates that increases
over time, in much the same way that cap-and-trade programs envision a schedule of caps
that falls over time. See, e.g., Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, sched. 1 (Can.), available at
http://www.bclaws.ca/Recon/document/ID/freeside/00_08040_01#Schedule1.
91. E.g., Climate Protection Act of 2013, S. 332, 113th Cong. (2013).
92. Carbon Tax, BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF FINANCE, http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/
tp/climate/carbon_tax.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
93. In other words, income taxes are cut equal to the revenue raised from carbon taxes.
This potential feature of emissions pricing—that revenues from reducing an environmental
externality can be used to reduce distortionary taxation—is termed the “double dividend.”
Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader’s Guide, 2
INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 157, 158 (1995).
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this creates a very different political economy for altering the tax’s strin-
gency relative to cap-and-trade. In particular, those that stand to benefit
from reductions in other distortionary taxes to a greater degree than they
will suffer from an increase in a carbon tax may well support the increase.
Thus, both environmental advocates and a broader constituency of benefi-
ciaries from reductions in other taxes are likely to sustain support for car-
bon taxes once enacted and resist calls to weaken them.
This difference in political economy is also reflected in the legislative
process for carbon tax enactment. Carbon taxes, in order to be enacted,
typically must either be proposed in or marked up in tax and or finance
committees. For examples, the British Columbia carbon tax was introduced
by the province’s finance minister at the time, Carole Taylor,94 and was
considered alongside other revenue measures, including changes in numer-
ous other taxes.95 Similarly, the Senate Finance Committee, in considering
broader tax reform issues, has mentioned a carbon tax as an option.96 Thus,
rather than being limited to review in the environmental or natural re-
sources committees of a legislature, carbon taxes are often, if not generally,
developed in committees with finance or revenue portfolios that implicate
different interest group politics both for and against them.
Consider one hypothetical example. Firms that pay very high corporate
income taxes, but face little carbon tax liability, such as a retail firm like
Wal-Mart, may support high carbon taxes if these are tied to reductions in
the corporate income tax rate. On the other hand, if a carbon tax out-
performs expectations and so leads to calls by impacted industries for reduc-
tion in stringency, firms that disproportionately benefit from reductions in
other taxes will help to counter the push for weakening. Wal-Mart, once it
has received the benefit of a reduction in tax liability, will be loath to return
to a higher rate so that American Electric Power can face a lower carbon tax
liability.
Discussions of using funds raised by carbon pricing for reducing other
taxes have so far been limited to carbon taxes. There is no theoretical reason
why a cap-and-trade could not pursue a similar strategy.97 Yet to the degree
94. See B. 37, Carbon Tax Act, 38th Parliament, 4th Sess. (Can. 2008) (as introduced
in Legislative Assembly), available at https://www.leg.bc.ca/38th4th/1st_read/gov37-1.htm.
95. See B. 2, Budget Measures Implementation Act, 38th Parliament, 4th Sess. (Can.
2008) (as introduced in Legislative Assembly), available at https://www.leg.bc.ca/38th4th/
1st_read/gov02-1.htm.
96. Stephen Stromberg, Carbon Tax on the Table in the Senate, WASHINGTON POST, Apr.
25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/04/25/carbon-tax-
on-the-table-in-the-senate/.
97. Larry Goulder and Andrew Schein point this out in their discussion of hybrid
carbon pricing policies. See generally Goulder & Schein, supra note 11.
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that cap-and-trade revenues, or allowances, have been used for any purpose
beyond distribution for free to regulated sources, the purposes have been
limited to the energy space. For example, many state participants in the
RGGI program utilize auction revenues to fund energy efficiency invest-
ments98 while California utilizes allowance auction revenues to fund further
greenhouse gas reduction measures.99 This may be because cap-and-trade
design processes are generally limited to and controlled by environmental
and energy regulators. By contrast, design of carbon taxes is generally a
shared responsibility of both environmental and budget and finance regula-
tors or legislative committees.100 For example, the details of the British Co-
lumbia carbon tax, including the determination of the size of corporate and
personal income tax reductions funded by carbon tax revenues, are adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Environment
or the Ministry of Energy and Mines.101
Evidence from British Columbia, where a carbon tax was introduced in
2008 and then increased from ten to thirty dollars per ton CO2e over a
period of several years102 does provide some evidence for this lock-in effect.
Revenues raised by the carbon tax were used to reduce personal and corpo-
rate income taxes. This carbon tax, a higher carbon price than in any cap-
and-trade program in the world, was phased in during the Great Recession
when many firms and households were experiencing economic distress.103
The British Columbia government opted to keep the tax at thirty dollars
after a study of its initial phase-in period and absent moves by neighboring
U.S. states or Canadian provinces to move towards regulation of green-
house gases.104 This decision to sustain the tax was made despite the fact
that the expectation that other jurisdictions would implement carbon pric-
ing during this period did not come to pass.105 The tax has sustained popu-
98. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, REGIONAL INVESTMENT OF RGGI CO2 ALLOW-
ANCE PROCEEDS 2012 3 (2014), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/2012-Invest-
ment-Report.pdf.
99. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE AUCTION PROCEEDS INVESTMENT PLAN: FISCAL YEARS
2013-14 THROUGH 2015-16 1-2 (2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auc-
tionproceeds/final_investment_plan.pdf.
100. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
101. See Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, part 2(2) (Can.) (defining “minister” as the
Minister of Finance).
102. B.C. MINISTRY OF FIN., JUNE BUDGET UPDATE 2013/14—2015/16 63 (2013), available at
http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2013_june_update/bfp/2013_June_Budget_Fiscal_Plan.pdf.
103. See Kathryn Harrison, The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax 14 n.27
(Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Working Paper No. 63, 2013), available at http://www
.oecd.org/env/workingpapers.htm.
104. B.C. MINISTRY OF FIN., supra note 102, at 64.
105. Harrison, supra note 103, at 10, 15-16.
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larity in the province.106 Any move to reduce the carbon tax has triggered
protest by both voters and firms with high tax liabilities relative to their
greenhouse gas emissions levels. This combination is a powerful blocking
constituency to the weakening of the carbon tax.
The Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM),107 known popularly
as the Australian Carbon Tax,108 might seem at first blush to be an impor-
tant counter example to the British Columbia carbon tax. The Australian
CPM was passed after great controversy in 2011 and phased-in in 2012.109
The program was the subject of heated debate in the 2014 elections and
ultimately, after the electoral triumph of Tony Abbott, a conservative who
opposed the policy, was repealed.110 But it is important to understand, as
many in the press apparently do not, that the CPM was not actually a
carbon tax. In its first two years, because of policymakers’ fears about vola-
tile carbon prices in cap-and-trade schemes in Europe,111 the CPM did op-
erate as a fixed price tax on emissions from large stationary sources.112 But
after that brief introductory period, the CPM transitioned to a cap-and-
trade system.113 The fixed price level at which the program was initiated,
AUS twenty-three dollars per ton, was extraordinarily high by international
standards and lacked the phased-in approach of other programs such as the
EU ETS or the British Columbia carbon tax.
In any case, after a closely fought election, the CPM was repealed in
2014 by the new conservative government in one of its first actions. It is
hard to know what lessons to draw from the Australian experience beyond
the conclusion that whatever the policy—tax, cap-and-trade, or hybrid—it
will be unstable if enacted by narrow majority in a context where a simple
majority can repeal legislation. This is likely to be especially true where the
policy enacted begins at a relatively stringent level without a phase-in as has
106. British Columbia’s Carbon Tax Woos Skeptics, THE ECONOMIST, July 21, 2011, http://
www.economist.com/node/18989175.
107. See About the Carbon Pricing Mechanism, CLEAN ENERGY REGULATOR, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T,
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/Carbon-Pricing-Mechanism/About-the-Mecha-
nism/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Jun 8, 2014); see also Clean Energy Act 2011 (Austl.),
available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00372.
108. See Repealing the Carbon Tax, DEP ’T OF THE ENV’T, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, http://www.envi-
ronment.gov.au/climate-change/repealing-carbon-tax (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
109. Carbon Tax Gets Green Light in Senate, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 8, 2011, http:/
/www.smh.com.au/business/carbon-tax-gets-green-light-in-senate-20111108-1n4rp.html.
110. Michelle Innis, Environmentalists Denounce Repeal of Australia’s Carbon Tax, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/world/asia/environmentalists-de-
cry-repeal-of-australias-carbon-tax.html.
111. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying discussion.
112. Clean Energy Act 2011 § 100.
113. Cf. id., section 14, specifying process for setting a carbon pollution cap, with id.,
section 100, specifying fixed charges per ton of pollution for initial years of program.
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been done for all other emissions trading schemes and for the British Co-
lumbia carbon tax.
One last point of comparison is important to draw between outcomes
under a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade that relates to the need for program
modification. Given the bias in emissions forecasts illustrated in Part I, all
cap-and-trade programs proposed by Congress in the past decade would
have resulted in substantially fewer emissions reductions below business as
usual and much lower allowance prices than forecast. This would have likely
led to calls for strengthening of the program via legislative amendment on
the part of environmental advocates. The outcome of such proposals would
have been highly uncertain, even absent current political realities in Con-
gress. Environmental laws are not often amended. The status quo, once
established, is very difficult to alter. Further, most legislators, having ex-
pended significant efforts on climate legislation, would no doubt have pri-
oritized other issue areas in allocating their time and political capital.
In other words, if the U.S. Congress had enacted Waxman-Markey or
one of the other cap-and-trade proposals, climate policy advocates would
have been stuck with a situation in which relatively little abatement was
occurring, allowance prices were very low, and the prospect of reform of the
cap-and-trade program was a remote possibility. By contrast, passage of a
carbon tax with prices similar to those envisioned by all parties for the
allowances under Waxman-Markey, would have led to much greater abate-
ment than anticipated and few, or at any rate likely unsuccessful, calls for
weakening of the pollution pricing scheme. Given the bias and variance in
emission forecasts, and the sensitivity of outcomes under cap-and-trade to
these projections, carbon taxes offer a much greater likelihood that all sides
in a climate regulation negotiation enjoy the benefit of the bargain.
CONCLUSIONS
This Article has argued that key information needed to design real cap-
and-trade programs is unavailable to policymakers. To do this, I performed
an assessment of forecast error for NEMS with the specific purpose of cap-
and-trade design in mind. My conclusions are that legislators need accurate
emissions forecasts in order to set the cap in cap-and-trade programs but
energy models are not up to the task. Forecasts are both biased and impre-
cise. This bias and imprecision may be by design, depending on the inten-
tions of model developers, or it may be an inevitable consequence of the
modeling framework.
Whatever its causes, the errors introduced into cap-and-trade policy
design by this information deficit will predictably lead to weaker than in-
tended cap-and-trade programs. Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence
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of the political economy of actual cap-and-trade policies points to strong
pressure to weaken regulation if programs are too stringent but much
weaker pressure to strengthen regulation if programs are weaker than ex-
pected. The interaction with model forecast error is important because the
bias in emissions forecasts leads predictably to weak programs that are then
very difficult to strengthen.
By contrast, carbon taxes do not require the same level of information
about future emissions in order to craft real policy. Carbon taxes are likely
to produce emissions reductions relative to baseline emissions with greater
certainty than a cap-and-trade because a real carbon tax will always create
incentives to lower emissions while real cap-and-trade may not. Finally, a
carbon tax that offsets other distortionary taxes is likely to be more robust
to efforts aimed at weakening it’s stringency than a cap-and-trade program
that, at the time of adoption, appears equally stringent but that in practice,
turns out to be weaker or stronger than predicted. Although a carbon tax
does not guarantee a certain level of emissions, given the politics and the
information problems of designing programs that do cap emissions, policy-
makers may be giving up less than they assume if they opt to price rather
than limit greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, given the bias in energy mod-
els used to design climate policies, carbon taxes are more likely to over-
deliver emissions reductions than under-deliver them.
In the short run, these insights may be important to states that face
compliance obligations under forthcoming EPA regulations.114 Eventually,
Congress or state legislatures will once again consider adopting comprehen-
sive limits on greenhouse gas emissions. In all cases, policymakers will likely
at least consider using some form of emissions pricing. When they do, they
should look critically at the quality of information upon which they rely to
design and evaluate climate policy. In the case of climate policy, this Article
has shown that the inability of energy models to accurately forecast future
emissions may favor adoption of a carbon tax approach over cap-and-trade.
114. What EPA is Doing, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollu-
tion-standards/what-epa-doing (last updated Oct. 28, 2014); see also Samuel D. Eisenberg,
Michael Wara, Adele C. Morris, Marta R. Darby & Joel Minor, A State Tax Approach to
Regulating Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act 1 (May 22, 2014) (discussion paper),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2440925 (arguing that state-
level carbon excise taxes are permitted as compliance with New Source Performance Stan-
dards under the Clean Air Act).
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